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-CASE COMMENTS
ALIEN

-

SUSPENSION

oF

DEPORTATION - USE OF CoNFmIDEnTAL

-Petitioner was ordered deported because he had
been a member of the Communist Party from 1985 to 1940. Although he met the prerequisites to the granting of relief as stated
in §244 (a) (5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 STAT.
215, 8 U.S.C. §1245 (a) (5) (1952), his application for suspension
of deportation was denied on the basis of confidential information
never disclosed to him. Held, that the Attorney General's regulation
permitting the use of undisclosed confidential information was consistent with §244(a) (5), and did not violate due process. Jay v.
Boyd, 350 U.S. 931 (1956) (5-4 decision).
Petitioner's deportation hearing was held in accordance with
congressional procedural demands, the order being based only on
the evidence produced at the inquiry. §242(a) (b) of the Immigration Act. In the absence of §244 (a) (5), petitioner would have
been deported immediately without recourse because of his Communist affiliation. Galvan v. Press,347 U.S. 522 (1954); Harisiades
v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1951). However, §244(a) (5) extended him the right to apply for suspension of deportation, and
to submit evidence to meet the requirements therefor. If these requirements had not been met, he would have been deported. Vichos
v. Brownell, 230 F.2d 45 (D.C. Cir. 1956). Although he did meet
the requirements, his application was denied under §244(a), granting the Attorney General the discretionary power to grant or refuse
such applications; and under 8 C.F.R. §244.3 (1952), permitting
such determinations to be made on the basis of confidential information.
Prior to this case, the Supreme Court had decided in similar
cases based on the use of confidential information: (1) nonresident
aliens may be excluded, United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy,
388 U.S. 537 (1948); (2) resident aliens may not be excluded,
Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953); (3) neither resident nor nonresident aliens may be expelled. See United States ex
rel. Mezei v. Shaughnessy, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); Wong Yang Sung
v. McGrath, 839 U.S. 33 (1945).
The disturbing, and perhaps the most distinctive feature of the
principal case is its minute departure from years of consistent decisions upholding the proposition that resident aliens acquire the
same constitutional protection of due process of law as is afforded
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a citizen of this country. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy,
supra; Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, supra; Comment, 67 HAiv. L.

Rxv. 99 (1954). Justice Clark stated in United States ex rel.
Mezei v. Shaughnessy, supra,at 212: "It is true that aliens who have
passed through our gates, even though illegally, may be expelled
only after proceedings conforming to the traditional standards of
fairness encompassed 'in due process of law."
Admitting that the resident alien and the citizen are equals
so far as the fifth amendment to the Constitution is concerned, this
decision may conceivably have some future adverse effect on the
constitutional rights of citizens, and the use of confidential information in proceedings against them. The possibility of such an
infringement should not escape the scrutiny of those who adhere
to the letter and the spirit of the Constitution. The fact that an
alien is involved in this case is inadequate refutation or assurance
that the decision will not be extended in the future. The mere fact
that the decision was made is sufficient cause for concern.
It must be admitted that the court was faced with the task of
weighing certain considerations on each side. The government
implies essentially three reasons for using such information, asserting
that the presentment in open court of certain facts would: (1) disclose the identity of secret service agents, bringing an end to their
activity as such; (2) expose government informers who are in
positions to supply pertinent information; (8) necessitate revealing
names and data concerning suspected or known, unsuspecting subversives, thereby disclosing the government's awareness of their
activities. See Parkerv. Lester, 112 F. Supp. 488 (N.D. Cal. 1953).
On the other side are the following considerations: (1) the
possible loss of constitutionally guaranteed rights; (2) the use of
inadequate, false, or generally inadmissible evidence; (3) the inability, through the denial of the right of cross-examination, to
expose the prejudice, mistake, veracity, credibility, and character
of the government's secret witness. See Mesatrosh v. United States,
77 Sup. Ct. 1 (1956); Jay v. Boyd, supra, (dissenting opinion of
Justice Black) at 744, (dissenting opinion of Justice Frankfurter) at
749; Matuso v. United States, 229 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1956).
It should be noted that the decision in the principal case motivated General Joseph M. Swing, Immigration Commissioner, to reevaluate the procedure of using confidential information. He points
out that such information will be used only when "the most compel-
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ling reasons involving the national safety or security are present",
and that the Commissioner himself-not a subordinate as in the
past-will certify that such secrecy is necessary. N.Y. Times, Nov.
4, 1956, §4E, p. 12, col 2.
While the recognition of the problem is of some consolation,
it may be argued that the doubtful use of confidential information
will not be rectified by a mere shift in administrative responsibility.
C. H. B., Jr.

CONSTITTI ONAL LAw-SuBTANTIVE

DuE PRocEss

AND EQUAL

DocTORs.Plaintiffs brought an original action in the supreme court of South
Carolina for a declaratory judgment that an act making it unlawful
for any person, whether previously licensed or not, to practice
naturopathy in the state, unless he meets certain prescribed qualifications, was unconstitutional. Held, that the act does not deprive
naturopaths of their property rights without due process of law or
deny them equal protection of the law. Dantzler v. Callison, 94
S.E.2d 177 (S.C. 1956).
PROTECInON-

NATuROPATHS REQUIRED TO BE MEDIcAL

The power of the states to regulate and license the practice of
certain callings has been universally accepted and stands virtually
uncontroverted. Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581 (1926); Hawker
v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S.
114 (1889). A person's business, profession or occupation is "property" within the meaning of the constitutional provision as to
due process of law. People v. Love, 289 Ill. 304, 181 N.E. 809
(1921). Thus, while the legislature can regulate a calling, it cannot prohibit it, unless the calling is inherently injurious to the
public health, safety or morals, or has a tendency to become so.
Adams v.- Tanner, 244 U.S. 325 (1917). This power of regulation
or prohibition is exercised by the legislature, and the courts refuse
to consider the wisdom behind the action, confining themselves to
the constitutional limitations which may be involved. Zahn v. Board
of Public Works, 274 U.S. 825 (1927); Adams v. Tanner, supra.
These limitations relate to the reasonableness of the action taken.
When the legislature makes requirements which have no relation
to a calling or are unattainable by reasonable study and application
they may operate to deprive an individual of his constitutional property rights. Butcher v. Maybury, 8 F.2d 155 (W.D. Wash. 1925);
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